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I. INTRODUCTION 
For years, merchants with customers in more than one state have 
relied on the relatively simple rule that sales and use1 taxes only need 
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to be collected and remitted on sales to customers in states where the 
merchant has an office, a storefront, employees or some other physical 
presence.2 
This rule had its origin in two pre-Internet Supreme Court 
decisions: National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Department of 
Revenue3 and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.4 In Bellas Hess, the Court 
held that the Commerce and Due Process Clauses prohibit states from 
imposing use tax collection obligations on businesses that do not have 
a physical presence in the taxing state.5 Twenty-five years later, Quill 
clarified that it is the Commerce Clause, not the Due Process Clause, 
that requires physical presence in the taxing state.6 
These cases were decided in the twentieth century. In the new 
millennium, the Internet has made it considerably easier to conduct 
cross-border sales without setting foot in another state. Ecommerce 
has grown exponentially.7 By selling products and services online 
instead of establishing physical storefronts or hiring salespeople in 
different states, many ecommerce businesses have been able to avoid 
liability for taxes in every state except the one in which the company 
is physically located. This has resulted in severe revenue shortfalls for 
states and municipalities.8  
 
1.  Sales and use taxes are taxes on consumption. In theory, they are taxes on 
purchasers. Most states require merchants to collect and remit them on behalf of 
purchasers, though. Sales taxes are taxes on transactions. Use taxes are taxes on a 
buyer’s use of a purchased product. In practice, they are functionally equivalent, 
with sales taxes being imposed on in-state purchases and use taxes being imposed 
on purchases from out-of-state vendors. See Adam B. Thimmesch, Taxing Honesty, 
118 W. VA. L. REV. 147, 151–57 (2015). 
2.  See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE TAXATION ¶ 19.02 (3d ed. 
2017) (describing the history of the Court’s nexus requirement). 
3.  386 U.S. 753 (1967) 
4.  504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
5.  Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967). 
6.  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308, 317–18 (1992). 
7.  In 1992, less than 2% of Americans had Internet access, and all forms of 
remote sales in the United States, including mail-order, totaled $180 billion. Today 
89% of the population has Internet access and e-commerce retail sales amount to 
approximately $453.5 billion per year. Since the beginning of the millennium, e-
commerce sales have increased from 0.8% to 8.9% of total retail sales in the United 
States. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018). 
8.  As of 2017, states were losing up to 33 billion dollars in sales tax revenues 
annually as a result of the physical presence rule. Id.; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-18-114, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: SALES TAXES, 
STATES COULD GAIN REVENUE FROM EXPANDED AUTHORITY, BUT BUSINESSES ARE 
LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE COMPLIANCE COSTS 5 (2017). 2
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Several states responded to revenue shortfalls by expanding their 
tax bases to include services and/or digital products, 9  enacting 
“affiliate nexus” tax laws,10 treating cookies on a person’s computer 
as a “physical presence” in the computer owner’s state, 11  and 
imposing tax obligations on online service providers (such as 
Amazon, Shopify, or Etsy) that facilitate other vendors’ sales. 12 
Another common approach has been to require out-of-state retailers 
to report untaxed sales, to notify buyers of the obligation to pay use 
taxes, or both.13  
Other states took a bolder approach. They deliberately imposed 
use tax collection obligations on out-of-state sellers with no physical 
presence in the state, hoping to provoke a constitutional challenge that 
would give the United States Supreme Court an opportunity to 
overrule Bellas Hess and Quill.14  South Dakota was one of these 
states. It required an out-of-state seller, whether it was physically 
present in the state or not, to collect and remit use tax if the seller 
either delivered more than $100,000 of goods or services into the state 
or conducted 200 or more transactions for the delivery of goods or 
services into the state.15 
The strategy was successful. Wayfair, Inc. and other large Internet 
retailers with no physical presence in South Dakota refused to collect 
the tax. South Dakota courts declared the law unconstitutional and the 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider the physical 
 
9.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32b-3 (West 2018) (taxing digital 
downloads). 
10.  Sometimes called “click-through nexus” or “Amazon laws,” these statutes 
deem a vendor to be physically present in a state if a resident of the state receives a 
payment whenever a sale by the vendor results from a customer clicking on a link 
to the vendor’s product or website that the resident has placed on his or her website. 
See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2018). Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington have enacted 
similar laws. Joseph Bishop-Henchman, The History of Internet Sales Taxes from 
1789 to the Present Day: South Dakota v. Wayfair, 2017-2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
269, 292 n.90. For another kind of “Amazon law,” see note 12 and accompanying 
text. 
11.  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5741.01(I)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2018); 830 
MASS. CODE REGS. § 64H.1.7(1)(b) (2018). 
12.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-5044 (2019). For another kind of 
Amazon law, see note 10. 
13.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112 (2018). 
14.  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2088–89 (2018). 
15.  S.B. 106, 2016 Leg. Assembly, 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016). 3
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presence requirement.16 Finding Quill to have been “flawed on its 
own terms,”17 the Court overruled Bellas Hess and Quill to the extent 
they prohibited states from imposing tax obligations on merchants 
without a physical presence in the state. The decision, South Dakota 
v. Wayfair, Inc., established that a state may impose tax obligations 
on a business if it has an “economic nexus” with the state even if it 
has no physical presence there.18 
 The elimination of the physical presence requirement created 
a great deal of uncertainty. Language in Wayfair seemed to suggest 
that physical presence, large sales volume, or large revenues are 
needed to establish the requisite nexus with a state for tax purposes.19 
States therefore scrambled to enact volume- and revenue-based use 
tax thresholds.20 Unfortunately, volume and revenue thresholds are 
not a great improvement over the physical presence standard. They 
are vulnerable to the same kinds of criticisms. A better solution is 
needed.  
II. THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT 
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Constitution gives Congress power “[t]o regulate Commerce 
. . . among the several States.”21 Known as the Commerce Clause, this 
provision was intended “to avoid the tendencies toward economic 
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later 
among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” 22 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has interpreted it to mean that states 
may neither discriminate against interstate commerce23 nor unduly 
burden it. 24  Together, these implied limitations on state power 
 
16.  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089. 
17. Id. at 2092. 
18.  Id. at 2099 
19.  Id. 
20.  Sarah Horn, Jill McNally & Rebecca Newton-Clarke, How States 
Responded to South Dakota v. Wayfair in 2018, THOMSON-REUTERS (Dec. 21, 
2018), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/blog/how-states-responded-to-south-dakota-
v-wayfair-in-2018/ 
21.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
22.  Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979). 
23.  Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005). 
24.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (State laws that 
“regulat[e] even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest . . . will be 
 4
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comprise what is known as the “dormant” Commerce Clause.25 
The theory of an implied “dormant” Commerce Clause has been 
the subject of a fair amount of criticism.26 The premise upon which it 
rests, though, seems sound: if the country is to function as one nation, 
then individual states cannot try to isolate themselves economically. 
Although Wayfair upheld a state’s imposition of use tax collection 
obligations on interstate sellers, the Court did not repudiate the 
doctrine. To the contrary, by applying the four-prong test articulated 
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady27 for assessing the validity of 
sales and use taxes under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court 
reaffirmed it.  
The four-prong Complete Auto Transit test requires state sales and 
use taxes to 
(a) not discriminate against interstate commerce;  
(b) be fairly apportioned; 
(c) be fairly related to the services the State provides; and 
(d) apply only to activities having a substantial nexus with the 
taxing State.28 
1. Nondiscrimination  
Nondiscrimination is central to the principle of federalism 
 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation 
to the putative local benefits”); see also S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 
U.S. 761, 779 (1945). 
25.  The phrase probably comes from Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in 
Gibbons v. Ogden, in which he wrote that the power to regulate interstate commerce 
“can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands 
of agents, or lie dormant.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189 (1824). 
26.  Justice Scalia took the position that discrimination is prohibited by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, not the Commerce Clause. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. 
Wash. Dep’t of Revenue 483 U.S. 232, 264 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Under this view, nothing in the Constitution would protect 
businesses from discriminatory taxes. The Privileges and Immunities Clause, by its 
terms, only protects citizens. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. Business entities are not 
citizens. Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 
U.S. 648, 658 (1981); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 176–77 (1868); cf. 
Adam Thimmesch, A Unifying Approach To Nexus Under The Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 116 MICH. L. REV. 101, 116 (2018) (arguing that the “nexus” prong of the 
dormant Commerce Clause should be abolished because it is subsumed under the 
“fair apportionment” and “relationship to services” prongs of the Complete Auto 
Transit test). 
27.  430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
28.  Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279.(1977). 5
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underlying the dormant Commerce Clause.  
This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, 
which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to 
control of the economy, including the vital power of 
erecting customs barriers against foreign competition, 
has as its corollary that the states are not separable 
economic units . . . “[W]hat is ultimate is the principle 
that one state, in its dealings with another, may not 
place itself in a position of economic isolation.”29 
For this reason, “where simple economic protectionism is effected 
by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been 
erected.”30 As applied to state sales and use taxes, this means that a 
state may not apply higher tax rates to interstate sales than to intrastate 
sales.31  
2. Undue Burden 
Discrimination is not the end of the inquiry. A state law that is 
nondiscriminatory on its face may nevertheless run afoul of the 
dormant Commerce Clause if it imposes an undue burden on interstate 
commerce.32 The three other prongs of the Complete Auto Transit 
test—fair apportionment, relationship to state-provided services, and 
nexus— are tools for determining whether a burden on interstate 
commerce is undue or not. 
“Fair apportionment” means state taxes on interstate commerce 
must be apportioned to reflect the taxpayer's activities in the taxing 
 
29.  H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1949) 
(quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)). 
30.  City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see also 
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005); H. P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 533; 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403–06 (1948); Baldwin., 294 U.S. at 511; Buck 
v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1925). 
31.  George M. Johnson, State Sales Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 24 
CALIF. L. REV. 155, 165 (1936). 
32.  State laws that “regulat[e] even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local 
public interest . . . will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 6
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jurisdiction. 33  Multiple or duplicative taxes unduly burden 
commerce.34 Each state should tax only the portion of the tax base that 
reflects the taxpayer’s activities in the state.35 This advances the goal 
of nondiscrimination against interstate commerce by preventing 
multiple taxation of interstate commerce, a burden that is not borne 
equally by wholly intrastate commerce.36 The “fair apportionment” 
requirement also ensures that states tax only those activities or values 
that have a substantial nexus with the state.37 
The third prong of the Complete Auto Transit test requires taxes 
to be reasonably related to services or benefits the taxing authority 
provides the taxpayer.38 Retailers with a physical presence in a state 
meet this requirement because they benefit from state-provided 
services like police and fire protection, roads and so on. Some kinds 
of services benefit all retailers, whether they have a physical presence 
in the state or not. These include things like courts for the collection 
of the purchase price from customers, 39  sound local banking 
institutions to support credit transactions, 40  and commercial and 
consumer protection laws that create a climate of consumer 
confidence inuring to the benefit of merchants.41 Sales and use taxes 
help sustain the market to which merchants sell goods and services.42  
 
33.  See, e.g., Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U.S. 217, 217–19 (1891); 
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891). Unfairly 
apportioned taxes also raise Due Process Clause issues. See Standard Oil Co. v. 
Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 
U.S. 158 (1933); Union Tank Line v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919); Union 
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905). 
34.  Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on 
Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37, 57 (1987). 
35.  Bradley W. Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Apportionment and the 
Prohibition on Extraterritorial State Taxation, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 150 
(2002). Fair apportionment is determined by internal consistency. In other words, if 
imposing the tax in every jurisdiction would result in more than 100% of the tax 
base (e.g., the sale price of a product), then the tax is not fairly apportioned. See, 
e.g., Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). 
36.  Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255–56 (1938). 
See generally Hellerstein, supra note 34. 
37.  Joondeph, supra note 35, at 151.  
38.  Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
39.  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 328 (1992) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. 
42.  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018) (“Taxes . . . 
are essential to create and secure the active market they supply with goods and 
services.”). 7
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a. The Physical Presence Requirement 
The fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test is “nexus.” A 
tax must be “apportioned to local activities within the taxing State 
forming sufficient nexus to support the tax.”43   
The “substantial nexus” prong of the Complete Auto Transit test 
seems to be grounded more in the Due Process Clause than the 
Commerce Clause.44  In reaching the conclusion that both Clauses 
prohibit the imposition of tax collection obligations on out-of-state 
sellers with no physical presence in the state, the Bellas Hess Court 
drew no distinction between the Due Process Clause and the 
Commerce Clause insofar as the “nexus” requirement was 
concerned.45 The Court later clarified, in Quill, that the Due Process 
and Commerce Clause “nexus” requirements are not identical. 
Physical presence is not required for Due Process nexus, but it is 
required for Commerce Clause nexus.46  
The physical presence of a person or property in a state creates a 
substantial nexus to the state because states provide protection and 
services to the people and property that are located within their 
territorial boundaries.47 In fairness, a company or property owner that 
receives state-provided benefits and protections should expect to be 
required to contribute to their cost. The Quill Court went further, 
holding that physical presence was not only a sufficient basis for 
imposing sales and use taxes; it was a necessary condition for the 
imposition of a tax collection obligation.48 The Court reasoned that if 
states could impose tax obligations on out-of-state merchants, then 
merchants who sell their products or services throughout the country 
could be subjected to collection obligations in thousands of different 
taxing jurisdictions.49 This, the Court believed, would unduly burden 
interstate commerce.50  
The Wayfair Court rejected the notion that physical presence is 
necessary to establish the requisite nexus for either Due Process or 
 
43.  Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 285. 
44.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 327 (White, J., dissenting); Complete Auto Transit, 430 
U.S. at 281–82, 285. 
45.  Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967). 
46.  Quill, 504 U.S., at 307–08, 311, 317–18 (majority opinion). 
47.  Bellas Hess, 386 U.S at 757; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 
359, 365 (1941) 
48.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 317–18.  
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. at 313 n.6. 8
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 41 [2020], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol41/iss1/2
Fall 2019] James 41 
Commerce Clause purposes.51 The burden of compliance with a tax 
obligation, the Court observed, is largely unrelated to whether a 
company has a physical presence in a state or not.52 “The physical 
presence rule is a poor proxy for the compliance costs faced by 
companies that do business in multiple States.”53  
This is a valid point. Some examples will help bring the problem 
into sharper relief. (For the sake of simplicity, assume compliance 
costs of $20 per state.) 
(a) Artemis.com, an online merchant, has a thousand 
employees and salespersons in New Hampshire but has 
no physical presence in any other state. Each year it 
makes over 1,000,000 sales to residents of other states. 
Because New Hampshire has no sales or use tax, and 
because Artemis.com has no physical presence in any 
other state, the physical presence requirement results 
in zero compliance costs for the company. 
 
(b) Ma & Pa Kettle Co. is a small local retailer that has 
decided to start selling to customers in other states. To 
that end, it enters into a contract with one individual in 
each state under which the individual will receive a 
commission on sales made to residents of that state. 
Each salesperson ends up making one $20 sale. If 
physical presence alone is determinative of nexus, then 
each of those states could require Kettle Co. to register 
with the state and to collect and remit use taxes. 
Compliance costs will put Kettle Co. out of business. 
   
The physical presence test also harms wholly local businesses. 
Exempting interstate retailers from sales and use tax obligations while 
requiring wholly intrastate retailers to comply with those obligations 
puts intrastate retailers at a competitive disadvantage.54 Further, the 
rule distorts the operation of markets, giving companies an incentive 
to avoid establishing storefronts and distribution centers, or to hire 
 
51.  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
52.  Id. at 2093. 
53.  Id.  
54.  Id. at 2094 (“In effect, Quill has come to serve as a judicially created tax 
shelter for businesses that decide to limit their physical presence and still sell their 
goods and services to a State’s consumers—something that has become easier and 
more prevalent as technology has advanced.”) 9
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employees in different states.55 This makes little sense, inasmuch as 
physical and virtual presence are functionally indistinguishable. In 
fact, “[a] virtual showroom can show far more inventory, in far more 
detail, and with greater opportunities for consumer and seller 
interaction than might be possible for local stores.”56 
b. Economic Nexus 
For all these reasons, it was reasonable for the Wayfair Court to 
discard the physical presence requirement. It raised a difficult 
question, though: If physical presence is not the requisite nexus, then 
what is? The Court would not say. Refusing to establish another 
bright-line test, the Court was only willing to commit to the 
proposition that “a nexus is established when the taxpayer [or 
collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on 
business’ in that jurisdiction.”57 The Court asserted that the volume of 
sales or revenue specified in the statute and alleged in the case before 
it “could not have occurred unless the seller had availed itself of the 
substantial privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota.”58 The 
South Dakota legislature had imposed tax collection and remission 
obligations on out-of-state sellers who deliver goods or services in an 
amount greater than $100,000 into the State or who engage in 200 or 
more separate transactions for the delivery of goods or services into 
the State.59 Despite the Court’s express disavowal of any intent to 
establish another bright-line test for nexus,60 state taxing authorities 
have interpreted the decision as establishing a sales volume threshold 
 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. at 2095. 
57.  Id. at 2099 (citing Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 
(2009)). 
58.  Id. 
59.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2016). The statute was enacted pursuant 
to an “[a]ct to provide for the collection of sales taxes from certain remote sellers, 
to establish certain Legislative findings, and to declare an emergency.” S. 106, 
20156 Leg. Assembly, 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016). Evidently the South Dakota 
legislature perceived the collection of sales taxes from out-of-state sellers as an 
emergency. 
60.  South Dakota had not sought to impose a tax obligation on low-volume 
out-of-state merchants. Consequently, it was not necessary for the Wayfair Court to 
address the question whether sales volume thresholds are necessary. “Because the 
Quill physical presence rule was an obvious barrier to the Act’s validity, these issues 
have not yet been litigated or briefed, and so the Court need not resolve them here.” 
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2019. 10
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for the taxation of out-of-state businesses. Several have already 
enacted laws specifying sales volume and/or dollar amount thresholds 
identical or very similar to South Dakota’s.61  
The idea that large sales volume and/or revenue are necessary to 
establish nexus may stem from the Court’s consistent use of the word 
substantial as a modifier of nexus. 62  The Court has also used 
substantial as a modifier of privilege of carrying on business.63 To 
many people, substantial means a large amount. Substantial can also 
mean real or essential. Using the term as a modifier of privilege rather 
than business in the phrase privilege of doing business in a state 
suggests the Court meant to use the term in the latter sense.  
Eschewing the judicial establishment of a volume or revenue 
threshold for tax nexus also comports with separation of powers 
doctrine. Courts do not have legislative power. That power is vested 
in Congress. 64  As one commentator has observed, “A decision 
establishing quantitative measures to determine when ‘substantial 
nexus’ exists . . . encroaches on the legislative responsibilities of 
Congress or the sovereign authority of state governments.”65 
The Court used the volume of sales in the case before it as 
circumstantial evidence of purposeful availment, 66  but it did not 
indicate that this was the only possible kind of evidence of purposeful 
availment.67  If there is direct evidence of purposeful availment in 
 
61.  Horn, McNally & Newton-Clarke, supra note 20. 
62.  See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
63.  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct.  at 2099. 
64.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1; see also John Harrison, Legislative Power and 
Judicial Power, 31 CONST. COMMENT 295, 299 (2016) (“A law-applying institution 
cannot announce a wholly new rule, not derived from existing law . . . ..”). For an 
overview of the principal rationales for separating judicial functions (adjudication) 
from legislative functions (policymaking), see Edward McWhinney, The Supreme 
Court and the Dilemma of Judicial Policy-Making, 39 MINN. L. REV. 837 (1955).  
65.  Jonathan E. Maddison, Why Wayfair Won’t Matter: Supreme Court Raises 
‘Substantial Nexus’ Controversy in Internet Age, Capturing Attention of Tax 
Specialists—and the Public TAX EXECUTIVE (May 31, 2018), 
http://taxexecutive.org/why-wayfair-wont-matter/. 
66.  The Court noted that the tax at issue applied only to merchants that deliver 
more than $100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or 
more separate transactions for the delivery of goods and services into South Dakota 
each year. “This quantity of business,” the Court declared, “could not have occurred 
unless the seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in 
South Dakota.” Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2009. 
67.  For example, the Court suggested that evidence that out-of-state merchants 
“are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual 
presence” might support a finding of purposeful availment. Id.  11
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connection with a single sale, or if another kind of circumstantial 
evidence supports an inference of purposeful availment in connection 
with a single sale, nothing in Wayfair precludes a finding that a single 
sale may furnish a sufficient nexus for purposes of a state’s authority 
to impose a use tax obligation.  
B. Due Process 
For Commerce Clause purposes, the relevant question is whether 
a tax discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce, not 
whether it is fair or unfair to a particular individual.68 The Wayfair 
Court blurred this distinction somewhat by deeming it essential to 
Commerce Clause analysis to decide whether taxpayers had 
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in 
the taxing state or not.69 Purposeful availment is relevant to fairness 
to an individual; it is a Due Process concept.70   
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
interpreted to mean, among other things, that a state’s regulatory 
power extends only to its territorial boundaries.71 State power over 
property may be predicated on the presence of the property within the 
state (in rem jurisdiction). State power over a person may be 
 
68.  Id. at 2092. 
69.  “Wayfair’s holding undoes some of Quill’s precision and again blurs the 
distinction between the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause as they apply 
to interstate taxation.” Alston & Bird, Thanks for the Memories, Quill: The Supreme 
Court Adopts a New Nexus Standard for Use Tax Collection, JDSUPRA (June 25, 
2018), https://www.idsupra.com/legalnews/thanks-for-the memories-quill-the-
88517/. The Court cited Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009) 
for the proposition that “nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails 
itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in the jurisdiction.” 
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. Polar Tankers, however, was a case interpreting the 
Tonnage Clause; it addressed neither Commerce Clause nor Due Process issues. 
Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 6. Moreover, the Polar Tankers Court cited Quill in 
support of the quoted proposition. Id. at 11. Ironically, Quill had carefully 
distinguished between Due Process nexus, which is concerned with fairness to the 
individual, and Commerce Clause nexus, which is “informed not so much by 
concerns about fairness for the individual defendant as by structural concerns about 
the effects of state regulation on the national economy.” Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).  
70.  See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); 
Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 
(1958). 
71.  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (suggesting that extraterritorial 
regulation would be an abuse of power).  12
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predicated on the presence of the person within the state (in personam 
jurisdiction). A state generally lacks jurisdiction, however, over non-
residents who have no property in the state.72 
While this principle is easy to state, it is difficult to apply to 
business entities. Corporations and certain other business entities are 
juridical “persons,”73 but they do not have a physical existence. Courts 
initially treated them as if they had a physical presence in the state of 
incorporation.74 Because corporate activity often extended beyond the 
boundaries of the state of incorporation, however, courts adopted 
alternative theories for the exercise of power over out-of-state 
business entities.75 One of these was consent. Relying on the principle 
that consent is an independent basis for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction, courts reasoned that when a state’s permission is needed 
for a foreign corporation to do business in the state, the foreign 
corporation implicitly consents to the state’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over the business transactions the corporation conducts within the 
state. 76  Under the agency theory, the presence of a human being 
conducting business on the corporation’s behalf within the state may 
establish the corporation’s physical presence in the state.77 Because 
the act of transacting business within a state is the deciding factor 
under either theory, they came to be subsumed under the general 
theory that a state has jurisdiction over any company that is “doing 
business” in the state.78  
International Shoe Co. v. Washington79 eliminated the consent 
and physical presence requirements altogether.  
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam if he be not 
present within the territory of the forum, he have 
certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
 
72.  Id. at 722, 724.  
73.  See, e.g., Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Christine 
M. Kailus, Diversity Jurisdiction and Unincorporated Businesses: Collapsing the 
Doctrinal Wall, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1543, 1545. 
74.  “[T]he corporation . . . dwell[s] in the place of its creation.” Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839). “[I]t must live and have its 
being in that state . . . .” Id.  
75.  See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882). 
76.  Id. at 356; Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407–
8 (1855). 
77.  Int’l Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 586 (1914). 
78.  Gary W. Westerberg, Case Note, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 346, 347 (1970). 
79.  326 U.S. 310 (1945). 13
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maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”80  
 
This rule, known as the “minimum contacts” test, means that a 
state may exercise power over a business that has no physical presence 
if the business has “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State” such that the business 
“should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”81 In the 
sales and use tax context, “due process requires some definite link, 
some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property 
or transaction it seeks to tax.”82  
It was established very early on that the connection (“nexus”) the 
Due Process Clause mandates does not require physical presence.83 
Bellas Hess seemed to mark a retreat from this position. This case 
involved Due Process and Commerce Clause challenges to the 
constitutionality of state taxes on sales by an out-of-state mail-order 
company to residents of the state.84 The company’s only contacts with 
the state were by mail and common carrier; it had no physical presence 
there.85 Asserting that analysis of the issues under the Due Process 
and Commerce Clauses is essentially the same,86 the Court held that 
the imposition of tax obligations on a mail-order company is 
unconstitutional when the company’s only contacts with the state are 
by mail and common carrier. 87  The Court insisted that a “sharp 
distinction” must be maintained between mail-order companies with 
retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State and those that “do 
no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or 
common carrier as part of a general interstate business.”88 Because the 
Court did not distinguish between the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses in reaching its decision, the case seemed to stand for the 
 
80.  Id. at 316 (citations omitted).  
81.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) 
(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).  
82.  Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954). 
83. See, e.g., Scripto Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) (holding that a 
company’s use of sales solicitors in another state may support tax jurisdiction over 
a company even if the solicitors are independent contractors and not agents or 
employees of the company). 
84.  Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967). 
85.  Id. at 754. 
86.  Id. at 756. 
87.  Id. at 758, 760. 
88.  Id. at 758. 14
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proposition that both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses require 
some sort of physical presence in the state in order to support a state’s 
imposition of sales or use tax obligations. 
In Quill, the Court acknowledged that it had erroneously conflated 
Due Process and Commerce Clause analysis in Bellas Hess.89 While 
reaffirming the holding in Bellas Hess to the extent it rested on the 
Commerce Clause, the Court overruled it to the extent it rested on the 
Due Process clause. 90  Quill Corp. was a mail- and phone-order 
marketer of office and business supplies whose only contacts with the 
state of North Dakota were by mail and common carrier. Like 
National Bellas Hess, Quill Corp. argued that a state could not 
constitutionally impose taxes on sales to residents that are made by a 
mail-order company with no physical presence there. The North 
Dakota Supreme Court sustained the tax, holding that Bellas Hess had 
become obsolete.91 The United States Supreme Court reversed. The 
Court clarified that there is no Due Process Clause violation if the 
business sought to be taxed has had minimum contacts with the state 
such that the imposition of the tax does not offend traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.92 So long as a company’s sales 
efforts are purposefully directed toward residents of a state, physical 
presence in the state is not necessary insofar as the Due Process Clause 
is concerned. 93  Irrespective of physical presence, a business that 
purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in 
another state has “fair warning that a particular activity may subject 
[it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”94 Consequently, there 
is nothing unfair about imposing tax obligations on an out-of-state 
seller that “purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic 
market in the forum State.”95  
In the absence of physical presence or consent, a state may not 
exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state company with respect to a 
claim that is unrelated to the company’s contacts with the state unless 
the company has continuous or systematic contacts with the state.96 
 
89. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (“The two 
constitutional requirements differ fundamentally.”). 
90.  Id. at 308, 314, 317–18.. 
91.  Id. at 303–4, 310. 
92.  Id. at 307.  
93.  Id. at 308; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 
(1985). 
94.  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
95. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307. 
96. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 
(2011). 15
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This may be the source of the idea that systematic and/or continuous 
contacts with a state are essential to a state’s Due Process authority to 
impose a sales or use tax on an out-of-state merchant. It must be kept 
in mind, however, that contacts only need to be “continuous or 
systematic” when the claim in question is unrelated to the contact with 
the state upon which jurisdiction is predicated.97 If contact with the 
state is continuous and systematic, then a court may exercise 
jurisdiction whether the claim relates to or arises out of a particular 
contact or not. 98  An exercise of jurisdiction may nevertheless be 
appropriate, however, even if a company’s contacts with the state are 
not continuous and systematic. The fact that the claim in question in 
a particular case relates to or arises out of a contact the company has 
had with the state may suffice. Sometimes even a single contact may 
suffice if it is related to the claim that is being asserted against the 
company.99 When a state only seeks to impose tax obligations for 
sales to which the tax directly relates, the state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction is directly related to the contact with the state. Since there 
is a direct connection between a sale and a tax on the same sale, proof 
of continuous or systematic contacts with the state should not be 
necessary. The sale to which the tax relates is the minimum contact 
that provides the necessary Due Process nexus.  
The rationale for the “purposeful availment” principle is that if a 
merchant knowingly and intentionally sells a product or service to a 
resident of a different state, then it should come as no surprise if the 
taxing authority in that state requires out-of-state merchants to collect 
and remit the same tax on the sale that a local merchant is required to 
collect and remit. There is nothing unfair about requiring interstate 
 
97.  See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); see also 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 414, 414–16 (1984) 
(requiring “continuous and systematic” contacts where the parties had conceded that 
the case did not arise out of and was not related to contacts with the forum state). 
98.  Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445–46 (19523). 
This is known as general jurisdiction. Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due 
Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 80–81. 
99.  McGee, 355 U.S. 220; cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) 
(upholding a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident individual who was 
involved in an automobile accident while driving on the state’s roads, where the 
claim arose out of the accident). This is known as specific jurisdiction. See Arthur 
T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1148 (1966); see also Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 
414–16. 16
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commerce to pay its fair share of taxes.100 
Unless a merchant has a physical presence in the taxing state or 
has consented to the state’s exercise of jurisdiction, the Due Process 
issue in sales and use tax cases is whether the merchant intended to 
direct a sale to a resident of the state. If so, then a Due Process nexus 
exists. 
III. THE INADEQUACY OF VOLUME THRESHOLDS 
Declaring the existence of constitutionally mandated volume 
thresholds, revenue thresholds, or both, without specifying what they 
are is problematic. How are courts to decide what volume or dollar 
amount is the appropriate threshold? South Dakota selected $100,000 
or 200 sales, but another state might specify $20,000 and 100 sales, 
$1,000 and 90 sales, $100 and 10 sales, or $10 and 1 sale. Without a 
foundation in principle, the economic nexus test is entirely arbitrary. 
The rationale for volume thresholds is that requiring small 
businesses to comply with multiple state tax obligations would be 
burdensome. 101  There are roughly 10,000 sales and use tax 
jurisdictions in the United States, each with the capacity to specify its 
own tax base and rate.102 Complying with all of these regulations 
would be burdensome. That much is obvious. The more difficult 
question is whether it would be unduly so. 
To be grounded in the Commerce Clause, the term undue needs to 
be construed with reference to its purpose, namely, to prevent states 
from either discriminating against interstate commerce or enacting 
laws that have the effect of favoring intrastate commerce over  
interstate commerce. 103  Every tax is a burden on taxpayers. The 
burden is of constitutional significance only if it is heavier for 
merchants engaged in interstate commerce than for local 
merchants.104   
 
100.  D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988); see also 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mont., 453 U.S. 609, 623 (1981) (“It was not the 
purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce 
from their just share of [the] state tax burden.”) 
101.  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2103 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
102.  Id. 
103.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
104.  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (majority opinion) (“[S]ince in-state businesses 
pay the taxes as well, the risk of discrimination against out-of-state sellers is 
avoided.”) A state law violates the Commerce Clause if it mandates “differential 
 17
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Complying with multiple tax obligations can be as burdensome 
for wholly intrastate businesses as for interstate businesses. The 
10,000 taxing jurisdictions in which merchants are potentially subject 
to collection and remittance obligations are not evenly distributed 
throughout the country. Iowa, for example, is a destination-based sales 
tax state 105  with 994 different sales tax jurisdictions. 106  Both the 
interstate and the wholly intrastate state merchant may potentially 
need to comply with 994 sets of tax regulations. If they both make the 
same kinds of sales to the same customers in the same parts of the 
state, their compliance burdens will be identical, regardless of whether 
they each make 200 sales and earn revenues of $100,000 or they make 
only one $1 sale. Volume of sales or revenue is no better proxy for the 
burden of compliance than physical presence.  
Moreover, limiting economic nexus to companies with the 
requisite “large” volume of sales and/or revenue from sales in a state 
will still give many interstate merchants a competitive advantage over 
local merchants. To see this, consider the following scenario (assume 
Wyoming has established volume/revenue thresholds like South 
Dakota’s): 
For years Bob, a Wyoming retailer, has made a living 
selling lawn tractors out of his store to Wyoming 
residents. He charges $2,000 plus $50 shipping and 
$150 sales tax, for a total of $2,200. This year, several 
dozen out-of-state companies established internet 
websites where they offer the same tractor for the same 
price but without charging sales or use taxes to 
Wyoming residents. Presented with an opportunity to 
 
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and 
burdens the latter.” Ore. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 
(1994); see also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988). “The mere 
fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a producer in one State from access to 
markets in other States.” Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005); see also 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. 
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).  
105.  Destination sales taxes are taxes that are calculated at the rate in effect in 
the jurisdiction whether the buyer is located. Origin sales taxes are calculated at the 
rate in effect where the seller is located. Mark Faggiano, Origin-Based and 
Destination-Based Sales Tax Collection 101, TAXJAR (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://blog.taxjar.com/charging-sales-tax-rates/ 
106.  Joseph Bishop-Henchman & Richard Borean, State Sales Tax Jurisdictions 
Approach 10,000, TAX FOUNDATION (Mar. 24, 2014), 
https://taxfoundation.org/state-sales-tax-jurisdictions-approach-10000. 18
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save $150, every person in Wyoming who buys a lawn 
tractor this year purchases it online and not from Bob. 
Although Wyoming residents bought hundreds of lawn 
tractors this year, no single online retailer sold more 
than 100 tractors or earned more than $100,000 from 
sales to Wyoming residents. Not having individually 
met the state’s “high volume or revenue” use tax 
thresholds, none of these businesses needs to collect 
and remit any taxes on these sales. Meanwhile Bob, 
having made no sales due to the ability of online 
retailers to undersell him by virtue of being tax-
exempt, goes out of business. 
 
Just as the physical presence requirement puts intrastate merchants 
at a competitive disadvantage, so volume- and revenue-thresholds for 
use tax liability put intrastate merchants at a competitive 
disadvantage.  
In his dissenting opinion in Bellas Hess, Justice Fortas suggested 
that “large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation” 
of a consumer market furnishes the requisite economic nexus to justify 
the imposition of tax obligations on out-of-state retailers.107 As has 
been shown, large sales volume is a poor proxy for the compliance 
burden. “Systematic” and “continuous” are not any better. An 
individual who makes a single multi-million-dollar sale to a resident 
of a state could not be said to be engaged in “systematic and 
continuous” sales in the state, yet requiring the collection of sales or 
use tax on this sale would be no more burdensome for the merchant 
than it would be for a local merchant. “Solicitation” should not suffice 
as a basis for imposing a tax, either.108 The only term Justice Fortas 
mentioned that might possibly suffice is “exploitation.”109  
Exploit can mean different things. It can mean “to make use of 
meanly or unfairly for one's own advantage.”110 Of course, a person’s 
 
107.  Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S., 753, 761–62 (1967) 
(Fortas, J., dissenting). 
108.  Cf. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (W.D. 
Pa. 1997) (establishing a sliding scale for Due Process nexus purposes, with 
websites that merely solicit customers through advertising having no nexus with the 
state, and those that are used for actually conducting business, such as entering into 
a sales contract, having a nexus).  
109.  Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 761–62 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
110.  Exploit, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merrian-
webster.com/dictionary/exploit (last visited October 23, 2019). 19
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mean or selfish disposition does not provide a constitutional basis for 
state tax powers.  If it did, then every taxing authority in the country 
would have constitutional authority to tax people in every state 
irrespective of any retailer’s physical presence or transaction of 
business there. Exploit can also refer to making productive use of 
something.111  Making use of a market means using the market to 
acquire value. A business that makes productive use of a market is 
availing itself of the privilege of carrying on business in the market. 
That is the relevant nexus.112  
It is well established that a sale has a sufficient nexus with the state 
in which it occurs to be taxable by that state.113 Provided it does not 
result in multiple taxation, a tax may be imposed even if the seller is 
located outside the state.114 “It [is] not the purpose of the commerce 
clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just 
share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the 
business.”115 
High sales or revenue volume is a poor proxy, as well, for the 
“purposeful availment” the Due Process Clause requires when a 
merchant neither consents to jurisdiction nor has any physical 
presence in a state. A vendor that uses an online marketplace to sell 
products might intend to sell only to residents of the state in which the 
vendor is located. It might even display a notice on its web page that 
sales are restricted exclusively to residents of the vendor’s state. If the 
vendor is selling digital downloads, neither the vendor nor the online 
marketplace provider may ever know which states the computers onto 
which files are downloaded are located. In these circumstances, it 
would make no difference whether the vendor sold thousands of 
downloads or only one. In neither case would a sale have been 
knowingly or intentionally made to a buyer in a particular state. 
 
111.  Id. 
112.  A “nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the 
substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that jurisdiction.” South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of 
Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009)). 
113.  Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995); 
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938) (rejecting the 
claim that the “mere formation of the contract between persons in different states” 
is not sufficient for purposes of tax nexus); see also 2 C. TROST & P. HARTMAN, 
FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 2d § 11:1, p. 471 (2003) 
(“Generally speaking, a sale is attributable to its destination.”) 
114.  Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 254.  
115.  Id. 20
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Meanwhile, a vendor who makes only one sale, a $99,999 item that 
he sells to a buyer whom he knows resides in a particular state, is 
knowingly and intentionally availing himself of the consumer market 
in that state despite the fact that the sale is below a “$100,000 or 200 
sales” threshold. High sales/revenue volume is no better proxy for 
purposeful availment than it is for the compliance burden.   
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
Of course, there can be no real doubt that sales and use taxes 
burden both interstate and intrastate commerce. There can also be 
little doubt that the prospect of multiple use tax obligations in multiple 
jurisdictions, all of which determine their own bases and rates, may 
deter companies from conducting sales in more than a handful of 
jurisdictions. If physical presence and volume thresholds are not 
viable limitations on state power to tax interstate sales, then what can 
be done to foster interstate commerce without at the same time 
disadvantaging wholly intrastate businesses? 
A. The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement 
After Quill was decided, the National Governor’s Association and 
the National Conference of State Legislatures created a Streamlined 
Sales and Use Tax Project. The goal was to simplify state sales and 
use tax collection to reduce the burden on interstate commerce. The 
result of this work was the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement 
(SSUTA).116 Among other things, the SSUTA calls for participating 
states to administer state and local taxes at the state level, rather than 
requiring businesses to remit taxes to individual local taxing 
jurisdictions.117  It also attempts to standardize state and local tax 
bases, rates, and definitions, in order to engender more uniformity 
among state and local tax laws.118 Simplified administration, returns, 
remittance and other procedures are also part of the program.119  
A downside to the SSUTA is that it does not prevent states from 
adopting volume and/or revenue thresholds. As has been seen, these 
 
116.  STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., STATE GUIDE TO THE 
STREAMLINED SALES TAX PROJECT 3 (2019), 
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/docs/default-source/guides/state-guide-to-
streamlined-sales-tax-project-2019-03-01.pdf,  
117.  Id. at 5. 
118.  Id. at 5–6. 
119.  Id. 21
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features can produce inequitable results and they continue to put local 
businesses at a competitive disadvantage relative to interstate 
merchants. Further, allowing states to define their own volume and 
revenue thresholds increases the complexity of the matrix of state and 
local sales and use taxes. This is not consistent with the goals of 
simplification and uniformity.  
A more fundamental drawback to the SSUTA is that it is entirely 
voluntary. However commendable its objectives may be, the success 
of the program depends entirely on voluntary state cooperation. To 
date, only twenty-four states are full SSUTA members.120 The top six 
sales tax collection states by population—California, Florida, Illinois, 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas—have not signed on.121 
B. Federal Legislation 
Congress may enact legislation regulating interstate commerce, 
and where it has done so, the legislation controls.122 So long as it does 
not overstep Due Process limitations, Congress may at any time 
replace judicially created rules regulating interstate commerce with 
rules of its own making.123 With that in mind, several proposals for 
congressional legislation have been advanced since Wayfair to lessen 
the burden of multiple state and local sales and use tax obligations on 
interstate commerce. 
1. Restoring the Physical Presence Requirement 
One way to lighten the burden on interstate merchants would be 
to reinstate the physical presence requirement. Congress could 
legislatively overrule Wayfair. This is the objective of a pending bill 
for a Stop Taxing Our Potential Act.124 Next to leaving states with 
revenue shortfalls, the most significant drawback to this approach is 
that it would return wholly intrastate businesses to their position of 
competitive disadvantage relative to interstate merchants.  
 
120. See State Information, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., 
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/Shared-Pages/State-Detail.(last visited 
October 26, 2019). 
121.  Id. 
122.  S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 769 (1945). 
123.  See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 424–25 (1946) 
124.  S. 128, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019). 22
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2. Small Business Exemption 
Another approach that Congress could take would be to federalize 
volume thresholds. H.R. 6824125 was an example of this approach. It 
would have prohibited states from imposing tax collection obligations 
on out-of-state sellers with under $10 million gross annual revenues 
until the states enter into a congressionally approved sales and use tax 
compact.  
Any legislation establishing volume thresholds, of course, will be 
vulnerable to a Due Process challenge unless it excludes the 
possibility that tax collection obligations may be imposed on vendors 
who have not purposefully availed themselves of a consumer market 
in the taxing jurisdiction. Accordingly, the legislation should address 
the phenomenon of vendors selling digital downloads through an 
automated third-party online marketplace provider. 126  Even if the 
legislation is drafted in a way that addresses that concern, a federally 
imposed volume threshold will still yield the same inequities that 
state-imposed volume thresholds do. 127  Moreover, setting the 
threshold at $10 million will put wholly intrastate businesses at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to all but a few interstate 
businesses.  
3. Retroactive Enforcement 
Several bills prohibiting retroactive enforcement of sales and use 
taxes against businesses lacking a physical presence in a state have 
been introduced.128 So far, none have been passed.  
4. Simplification, Centralization, Uniformity 
One promising approach is to require states that wish to impose 
tax collection obligations on out-of-state merchants to enact 
simplified, uniform sales and use tax laws that provide for centralized 
collection. The proposed Protecting Businesses from Burdensome 
Compliance Costs Act of 2019129 is an example. It would prohibit a 
 
125.  115th Cong., 2d Sess. (2018); see also S.B. 3725, 115th Cong. (2018), 
which also would have established an exemption for remote sellers with less than 
$10 million gross annual revenues. 
126.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
127.  See discussion supra Part III.  
128.  See, e.g., Protecting Businesses from Burdensome Compliance Cost Act of 
2018, H.R. 6724, 115th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2018). 
129.  H.R. 369, 116th Cong. 1st Sess. (2019). 23
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state from imposing a tax collection obligation on a remote seller that 
lacks a physical presence in the state unless the state has established a 
uniform sales tax rate and a centralized collections system.130 Local 
taxes, if any, would need to be collected through the state’s centralized 
collections system, as opposed to requiring remote sellers to remit 
payments to each of the potentially thousands of local taxing 
jurisdictions individually.131 The state sales and use tax rate would be 
uniform throughout the state, and the combined state and local tax 
would be the same for both remote and local sellers.132  
Because it does not simply call for reinstating the physical 
presence requirement, and does not impose volume or revenue 
thresholds, this bill is fairer to local businesses and better serves state 
revenue-raising interests than other proposals. The requirement of 
centralized collection and disbursement of state and local taxes should 
benefit both interstate and wholly intrastate businesses, without 
operating to the advantage or disadvantage of either.   
The bill could be improved by requiring states to make available 
a free software program, or at least a publicly accessible web page 
merchants and/or buyers could use to calculate sales or use tax at the 
time of sale. Ideally the web page or program would correlate a 
purchaser’s zip code to the appropriate state and local sales tax rate on 
the purchase. This would involve some cost. The costs, however, 
would be offset, in whole or at least in part, by increased compliance 
with sales and use tax collection and remittance obligations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Commerce Clause generally should not present an obstacle to 
a state’s imposition of the same sales or use tax obligations on out-of-
state merchants as are imposed on wholly intrastate merchants. It 
should only be a problem if an out-of-state seller would incur greater 
compliance costs than an intrastate seller would incur for the same 
number, amount and kinds of sales in the state. Whether a merchant 
has low or high sales volume or revenues, a sufficient nexus may exist 
for the imposition of a tax collection obligation if a merchant has 
purposefully availed itself of the consumer market in that state by 
knowingly or intentionally making an actual sale to a resident of the 
state. 
 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. 24
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Neither physical presence nor high sales volume or revenue 
thresholds are adequate proxies for either purposeful availment or 
substantial nexus. The time is ripe for Congress to exercise its 
Commerce Clause power to ameliorate the burden on commerce that 
state and local sales and use taxes impose. Proposals to legislatively 
overrule Wayfair by reinstating the physical presence requirement, or 
to establish a national volume threshold, are unsound. Federal 
legislation mandating simplicity, centralization of administration and 
collection, and greater uniformity is a more promising approach.  
Coupled with accessible tax calculation software or web-based 
resources keyed to zip codes, this approach would accommodate state 
revenue interests while  facilitating commerce in a way that does not 
disadvantage either interstate or intrastate commerce, thereby coming 
closer to realizing the Founders’ vision of a coalition of individual 
states working together as one nation.  
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